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ABSTRACT
The commanding of spacecraft is a potentially
hazardous activity for the safety of the
spacecraft. Present day control systems contain
safety features in their commanding subsystem
and in addition, strict procedures are also
followed by operations staff.
However, problems have occurred on a
number of missions as a result of erroneous
commanding leading in some cases to
spacecraft contingencies and even to near loss
of the spacecraft. The problems of checking
commands in advance are increased by the
tendency in modem spacecraft to use
blocked/time-tagged commands and the
increased usage of on-board computers, for
which commands changing on-board software
tables can radically change spacecraft or
subsystem behaviour.
This paper reports on an on-going study. The
study aims to improve the approach to safety
of spacecraft commanding. It will show how
ensuring "safe" commanding can be carried
out more efficiently, and with greater
reliability, with the help of knowledge based
systems and/or fast simulators.
The whole concept will be developed based on
the Object-Oriented approach.
Keywords: Telecommanding, Safety,
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1. INTRODUCTION
This paper gives an interim report on a study
of the safety aspects of spacecraft
commanding. The overall aim of the study is
to demonstrate the feasibility of model-based
command checking.
The study examines user requirements for such
a system. Based upon these requirements the
functional requirements and the architectural
design is being produced. Finally a prototype
of at least the basic mechanisms of the design
will be developed and demonstrated.
The whole concept will be developed based on
the Object-Oriented approach. The common
environment must provide the different
spacecraft users with the same kind of user
interface facilities in order to offer a consistent
operational environment.
The ESA SCOS II system (under development)
is being taken as th_ reference system to be
interfaced. SCOS II will operate in a hardware
and basic software environment that is vendor-
independent.
The function of a SCOS II ( Spacecraft
Control Operations System) system are seen as
a collection of independent models of various
parts of the spacecraft and the ground
segment. SCOS II will therefore provide a
library of 'building blocks', which can be
combined in various ways to produce the
overall model. To allow this to be done easily,
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object-oriented software engineering
technology has been updated for analysis and
implementation of SCOS II. Specifically the
Coad/Yourdon method and the C+ +
programming language have been chosen.
Not all missions are the same, which led to
make modifications to the library building
blocks to be used in a specific mission. Using
an object-oriented technique known as
'inheritance', it will be possible to provide a
customised building block for a given mission,
whilst maintaining the same interface.
The SCOS II system will be hosted on a Local
Area Network (LAN) of distributed UNIX
workstations. Some centralised services of the
system will be provided by server processors
(client-server concept). The use of a
distributed system also offers advantages in
terms of system availability and failure
tolerance.
An initial delivery of the SCOS II system is
foreseen for end 1994. It will contain basic
functions of the system. The Huyghens-
Cassini, Envisat and XMM spacecrafts will
make use of the SCOS II infrastructure
software.
2. BACKGROUND
2.1 CURRENTSTATUS
It is useful to describe first the general ESOC
approach to handling of commands by the
Mission Control System ( MCS ) for currently
supported missions, which however can be
significantly modified for specific missions.
• Command Preparation Checking
In the command database to determine
allowable ranges of parameters, etc.
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Automatic checks on "manual or
automatic stacks of commands" at time
of entry of command parameters.
Pre-Transmission Validation (PTV) of
commands
The normal route for all commands
involves a pretransmission validation
(PTV) before the command is passed to
the ground station for uplink. PTVs are
defined in the command database.
Checks normally performed in PTV
are:
TC configuration ( e.g. check that the
TC subsystem has not been disabled )
Spacecraft and subsystem status, as
computed from incoming telemetry
parameters. The TM parameters and
the mode computation are specified in
the command database. PTV can be
disabled by the operator and by the
command source. PTV does not
provide for limit checking or other
checks of individual command
parameters or of parameters sets.
Checking of command contents
This is not a standard facility on the
ESOC Mission control system; it varies
from one mission to the other. Any
such checks performed are limited
since :
They are only static limit checks ( e.g.
lower and upper limits ) on individual
parameters.
Many commands cannot be checked
against fixed limit checks alone
because of interdependence between
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parameters.
The correctness of multiple command
activities cannot correctly be checked.
Command parameters are obviously
important parts of a command and for
some commands the value of the
parameters can be vital for the
spacecraft safety.
No on-line checking of combination of
commands and command parameters nor pre-
execution validation of commands against
predicted spacecraft status is carried out or
envisaged for current "in flight" or near future
missions ( ERS-2, ISO, CLUSTER )
2.2 PLANNED DEVELOPMENTS
Future missions to be supported by the ESA
SCOS II ( under development ) will be
controlled using approaches to commanding
which are likely to differ significantly from the
current one. Special services should be
provided to increase the safety of
commanding. Two additional types of
conditions will be used in making these safety
checks :
a predicted set of conditions in the on-
board status applicable at the ( future )
time of execution (and not necessarily
at the time of release)
a set of "operational constraint" rules
to be obeyed following command
execution.
These checks are carried out based on a
prediction of the on-board status at the planned
execution time ( Predictive Knowledge ). Thus
a capability to propagate the on-board status
needs to be available for all the potential
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sources of commands ( Manual Command, on-
board Master Schedule and ground automatic
command files ).
Predictive Knowledge allows the prediction of
future states of the system under control
(satellite modes, measurements, etc) from a
"known initial state" and taking into account
planned commanding activities and predicted
mission events.
This Predictive Knowledge can be produced in
two ways •
Evolution of the system in the absence
of any commanding activity (Evolution
Predictive Knowledge )
Evolution of the system under the
influence of Telecommanding
(commanding Predictive Knowledge).
In addition , detected or predicted on-board
autonomous actions can be treated in an
analogous manner to telecommand actions.
Specific attention shall be given to the
handling of asynchronous on-board actions
(these are often the result of failures and
related on-board corrective actions ).
This knowledge may be in the form of
algorithmic, heuristic or mathematical models.
The predictions will be required both over a
short term (e.g. for satellite health monitoring)
and over a long term ( e.g. to validate a plan
spanning several days ).
3. OVERALL APPROACH
The study has the following steps :
• Problem, methodology analysis and
evaluation of the ESOC requirements
• Software Requirements Phase
Architectural design of the system
Prototyping and demonstration of the
basic design
4. BASIC REQUIREMENTS
The central idea is the use of a Model of the
satellite. The definition of this Model of the
spacecraft is the most critical part of the study.
It is of course of major importance that the
real system is modelled as close as possible.
The Model has to run quickly to allow
predictions for some time in the future
(typically 48 hours for EURECA) in case of
on-board time-tagged commands checking.
During operations this Model must be capable
to be connected to ( or be a part of ) the
spacecraft control system whereas during the
validation phase to the Expert Tool system for
FOP ( Flight Operation Procedures )
production. The following scenarios are
considered :
a.
"On-line" : The Model is part of the
mission Control System ( SCOS II),
and each command is checked ( .e.g
for consistency with the modelled
"image" of the spacecraft ) before
being released for uplinking to the
spacecraft.
b. "Near Realtime" : The set of
commands to be sent to the spacecraft
(either from Manual Command or
Automatic Schedule) are previously
uplinked ( or could be done "directly"
by the system ) to the Model respecting
the "timelining" ( timing and ordering
of activities ). This should allow the
user to view the changing state of the
Model while it is being "operated" and
will also perform concurrent safety
checking and validation of the
operations in each scenario exercised.
The command validation function (in
the Model ) should use the Predictive
Knowledge of the impact of the
command ( together with any other
planned or predictable actions ) to
cause the rejection of a TC based on
predicted effects which violate any
health criteria. This information will be
passed to SCOS II, which will inhibit
the uplink of the command.
During Planning validation ( sequence
of commands as output of the mission
planning ) it will normally be necessary
to propagate the mission state during
the planning interval in order to :
establish that pre- and post-
conditions for activities are
fulfilled
to confirm that health criteria
are continuously satisfied
during the planning interval
C.
"Off-line": User selected Flight
Control Procedures ( FCP ),
Contingency Recovery Procedures
(CRP) or timelines shall be applied to
the Model in order to validate the
operations (Procedure Validation).
The following Model operating scenario could
be envisaged •
The Model is initialised with the
available TM in order to synchronize
the its internal state with the real state
of the spacecraft.
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As a second step the Model is let to
evolve by means of a prediction
generation function, taking into account
the planned on-board mission events
and / or commanding activities.
The Model could also be used as follows:
Verification of commands executed in
the past (e.g. comparison of playback
telemetry and predicted mission status)
Monitoring functions including the
display of predicted telemetry
parameters during "non visibility"
periods.
Diagnosis : The deviations of predicted
values from the expected ones could be
detected and analysed. To this aim a
knowledge not completely contained in
the Model is required ( e.g. diagnosis
charts and fault trees contained in the
spacecraft Operations Requirement
Handbook )
The Model is a central concept on this study.
It predicts mission states related to future
mission times. The selected approach is based
on two types of model :
A complete Model for near real time
and off-line scenarios
Detailed spacecraft subsystems models
are developed at ESOC for each
mission, as part of spacecraft dynamic
simulators used for validation of
control system software and Flight
Control Procedures as well as for staff
training. This type of simulators run 30
times faster than real time when
running on an ALPHA VAX platform.
The Model is extracted from an
existing spacecraft simulator. It shows
the best precision in the states
prediction in spite of a lower speed.
For this reason it will be used when
greater accuracy is required.
A simplified Model using knowledge
based techniches for real time scenarios
High speed performances are met but a
lower accuracy in the computation of
predicted states is shown. The Model is
build up extracting the mission
information from a selected repository
( e.g. the Mission base in SCOS II )
and adding manually the missing
information.
This two Model approach should be used for
model validation. In order to trust such a
system strong emphasis should be put into the
verification and validation of the models.
5. SOFTWARE REQUIREMENTS
The Software Requirements Document defines
the functional requirements of the system
according to the SCOS II Development
Standards.
The document covers the system functionality,
outlines standards for input and output data
which they should handle, and shows how they
should interface to the wider operational
environment in the future.
The whole concept is being developed based
on the Object Oriented approach. The expected
benefits of OO for the Model of the spacecraft
are •
natural modelling of the architecture of
the spacecraft
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flexibility ( via properties
inheritance and polymorphism )
different levels of abstraction,
permitting viewing of the Model at
different levels of complexity
• potential of reusability
The design and implementation of the system
should support the Object Oriented Paradigm.
The system should interface with SCOS II and
should be based on "open architecture" so as
to allow for additionally functionalities via
added modules.
The system has to be based on UNIX, and
developed and maintained on SUN platforms.
However it will be capable to run on any of
the main line of available UNIX platforms
(e.g. SUN, HP, IBM and Digital).
The main constraints are the following:
The system should access the SCOS II
Mission Information Base to derive the
Predictive Knowledge, the operational
constraints and the execution
verification criteria. The user should
not insert significant additional
information.
The system should not cause detectable
performance degradation on SCOS II
real operations.
The system should have the capability
of synchronizing its internal Model
status with the real spacecraft data and
status.
After an Object Oriented Analysis of the
system the following OO diagrams were
produced •
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It focuses both on the Model related
abstraction level and on the high level
internal decomposition of the system.
The two Model approach is introduced
as a keypoint in the whole system
organization. A "complete" Model
cooperates with a "simplified" one to
obtain the best performances in terms
of accuracy and computation speed.
• Database level OO Diagram
It shows the database internal
organization focusing on the elements
needed to build the Model ( e.g.
system element, activity, application
criteria of system elements, verification
and validation criteria of activities)
• Operational Context Diagram
It describes the different operational
scenarios, particularly the real time
case which is the most complex one
The following interfaces are envisaged:
SCOS II command stacks ( e.g. manual
and automatic stacks )
• SCOS II Mission Implementation Base
Display of system outputs on SCOS II
Man Machine Interface
Telemetry acquisition from SCOS II
telemetry Processor
Flight Operations Procedures Set Tool
to read and process Flight Operation
Procedures in the off-line case
• Model of an existing spacecraft
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simulator to be used as the "complete"
Model
6. CONCLUSIONS
At the time of writing this paper ( July 1994 )
the Architectural Design Phase is in progress.
This phase defines the architectural concept,
considering all functions and also how the
system should support future expansion and
modification of functionality. The
Architectural Design Document should include
detailed descriptions of all critical design
elements, such as data storage architecture and
access methods, control data structures,
knowledge representation and all external data
interfaces.
During a second phase the study should
produce the following -
o
I.
2.
3°
4.
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O A detailed Design and implementation
of a prototype. A spacecraft subsystem
should be identified to develop such a
prototype ( a partial Model ). It will be
integrated with the SCOS II system at
ESOC
A Detailed Design Document ( DDD )
of the prototype
),
A Software User Manual ( SUM ) of
the prototype
This study aims to produce a prototype to
improve the approach to safety of spacecraft
commanding by using model-based command
checking systems. This philosophy can then be
used for upcoming ESA missions such as those
of XMM and Integral.
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